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Notes
The True Man & the Battered Woman:
Prospects for Gender-Neutral Narratives in
Self-Defense Doctrines
*

Katelyn E. Keegan

The recent rise of controversial Stand Your Ground laws has sparked discussions on
self-defense law. Comparing the new Stand Your Ground laws with another selfdefense doctrine—Battered Women’s Syndrome—it becomes apparent that the law
solidifies gender stereotypes by assessing when an individual is justified in using deadly
force against an aggressor. “True men” are empowered to use deadly force in public
without a duty to retreat, while a battered woman often must provide expert testimony
on her psychological condition to prove the reasonableness of her use of deadly force
in light of her severe helplessness. At their extremes, both of these doctrines are
detrimental to the criminal law and potentially encourage dangerous policy and
undesirable public conduct.
This Note argues that legal reforms should moderate these extremes and create a more
gender-neutral process for proving self-defense claims no matter the theory. While the
psychology of juror decisionmaking and the public’s familiarity with the classic
narratives likely limit prospects for reform, change is necessary to modernize and
equalize self-defense law. Ideally, a new legal framework of individualization for
proving self-defense claims can find the middle ground between the empowerment
doctrine of true men and the helplessness ideology behind Battered Women’s
Syndrome, and will allow the jury to listen to each defendant’s narrative regardless of
whether it falls under the traditional paradigm.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and Executive Notes
Editor of the Hastings Law Journal. B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 2009. I would like
to thank Professor David Faigman for his invaluable guidance and expertise, as well as the members of
the Hastings Law Journal for their dedication to making each issue exceptional. Also, a special thank
you to my parents, sisters, and Nick for their endless love and support throughout law school.
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Introduction
The True Man Doctrine and Battered Women’s Syndrome are two
theories of self-defense that expose gendered distinctions in criminal law
by differentiating between the courageous man protecting his family and
home, and the subordinate, helpless woman left with no option but to
kill. Such distinctions ignore the similarities of these two situations and
the mutual zone of reasonable conduct under a threat of violence from
an aggressor, whether a stranger or a familiar abuser. This Note argues
that there should be a gender-neutral and individualized assessment of
justification narratives available to reasonable people—both men and
women—under dire circumstances that require the use of self-defense.
Affirmative defenses in the criminal law aim to limit or eliminate
culpability. Defenses are divided into two categories: justifications and
excuses. When a defense is treated as an excuse rather than a justification,
the jury views the defendant’s act as wrong and only tolerable because of
1
her mental or emotional state. Conversely, justified conduct is encouraged
under the law, and the jury approves of the defendant’s act due to
2
surrounding circumstances.

1. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of SelfDefense, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 623, 631 (1980).
2. Id.
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In homicide cases, defendants often turn to the well-recognized selfdefense justification. Self-defense generally requires imminence and
necessity, and the defendant carries the burden to establish both
3
elements. As Joshua Dressler describes, “deadly force is only justified in
self-protection if the actor reasonably believes that its use is necessary to
4
prevent imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by the aggressor.” It
is unsurprising that these two elements require a high standard of proof,
as the result of a successful self-defense claim is an acquittal.
English common law provided a foundation for self-defense in the
5
United States. England required that an individual claiming self-defense
could only do so when the individual used deadly force as a last resort
after being physically backed against a wall with no opportunity to
6
escape. American common law adopted this English tradition in early
7
self-defense doctrine. Over time, the historical requirement of a duty to
retreat eroded in favor of allowing an individual to “stand his ground” in
8
order to protect his family and property. Criminal law refers to this
policy as the “True Man” doctrine, which recognizes the traditional role
of men and the expectation that they are the sole guardians of the family
9
and home.
Historically, the state condoned the use of deadly force not only in
and around the home, but also in public places so long as the defender
10
lawfully had a right to be there. This policy justified deadly force even
11
when retreat was a viable option. An individual needed only to show he
had a lawful right to be somewhere, and the state condoned the person’s
12
use of deadly force to protect himself. The rise of “Stand Your Ground”
laws is the newest example of the use of True Man ideology as a valid
13
justification for deadly force.

3. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4 (2d ed. 2003) (“One who is not
the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a reasonable amount of force against his adversary
when he reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his
adversary and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this danger.”).
4. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 18.01[B], at 223 (5th ed. 2009) (emphasis
omitted).
5. Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 Harv. J.L. & Gender
237, 240–43 (2008).
6. Benjamin Levin, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 47 Harv. J. on
Legis. 523, 528 (2010).
7. Id. at 531.
8. Id.
9. Suk, supra note 5, at 244–45.
10. Id. at 246.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 261.
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The long history of the True Man doctrine contrasts starkly with the
development of another theory of self-defense: Battered Women’s
Syndrome (“BWS” or the “Syndrome”). Unlike the extensive presence of
the True Man ideology in America, BWS is a fairly recent legal construct
that came into existence in 1979 to provide domestic violence victims the
ability to claim self-defense despite different experiences of imminence
14
and necessity than under traditional self-defense law. Currently, the
majority of jurisdictions allow evidence of BWS to support a claim of self15
defense. However, courts generally “understand the syndrome in more
16
diagnostic terms . . . as a subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder.”
This psychological classification has created problems for defendants
17
whose experiences do not fit within this kind of medical condition.
When comparing these two theories of self-defense, it is apparent
that these doctrines fall along gendered lines. This Note argues that both
narratives are dangerous at their extremes. Because these doctrines are
so dependent on stereotypical gender roles, they preclude individuals
from using either justification effectively if their experience falls outside
of the accepted narrative. Women should be justified in using force
against an abusive partner just as much as a man should feel empowered
to protect himself, his family, and his home in the face of an attacker.
Justification narratives should include a middle ground between
helplessness and empowerment that could be used by reasonable people
claiming self-defense. The creation of a gender-neutral framework based
on reasonableness could counteract the threat of conventional
stereotypes on criminal justice.
Unfortunately, legal reform may be insufficient to solve the
problem. Social psychology demonstrates that juror decisionmaking
depends so heavily on the commonly accepted narrative that jurors may
18
cling to the historic interpretations of legal doctrines despite reforms.
Psychologists developed BWS to combat the restraints of the True Man
19
narrative, but in doing so they created an entirely different storytelling
framework. The initial effort to create a separate doctrine for domestic
violence victims has created problems for defendants seeking to draw
parallels between their use of force and the traditional aggressor’s. In
practice, BWS creates more barriers between the narratives of abused
women and “true men” than bridges. Any hope for successful changes to

14. See generally David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and the Science
of Expert Testimony, 2 Mod. Sci. Evidence § 13:1 (2012).
15. 23 Corpus Juris Secundum: Criminal Law § 1449, at 124 (2012).
16. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:3.
17. Id. § 13:4
18. See Janine Young Kim, The Rhetoric of Self-Defense, 13 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 261, 264 (2008).
19. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:1.
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the legal doctrine must take into account jurors’ use of narratives and the
potential prejudices that coincide with traditional decisionmaking
psychology.
Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of the True Man
doctrine and the recent emergence of Stand Your Ground laws. Part II
summarizes the evolution of BWS and its common interpretation as a
psychological defect. Part II also details the evidentiary burdens that a
defendant claiming BWS must overcome, including the importance of
expert psychological testimony. Part III describes the social psychology
behind juror decisionmaking and the interpretation of the “reasonable
person” in the criminal law. Part IV proposes a gender-neutral
framework for evaluating claims without the detrimental effects of
stereotypes and the likelihood of success given the subconscious thought
process behind juror decisionmaking.

I. The Empowered Man: The True Man Doctrine and the
Emergence of Stand Your Ground Laws
A. History of the True Man Doctrine
[T]he defense of one’s self is a requirement of the masculine mystique.
20
—Frederick Baum

English common law enforced a duty to retreat in self-defense
claims, and any person who used deadly force in self-defense “must have
21
first retreated until his back was to the wall.” The so-called retreat
requirement supported an individual’s claims of necessity and imminence
because a person could not physically escape a dangerous situation
without the use of force. Despite the strict duty to retreat, the English
still adopted an exception to the duty in the case of an attack inside one’s
22
own home. Early self-defense doctrine “embod[ied] the common law
idea that in his home, a man may forcefully defend himself, his family,
23
and his property against harm by others.” This common law rule of the
so-called “castle doctrine” carried over into early American law, and
allowed an individual to use deadly force against an aggressor inside of
24
his home to prevent harm to persons or property.
In the late nineteenth-century, American law expanded the doctrine
of self-defense and recognized the right to stand one’s ground to kill in
self-defense, both in his home and anywhere he lawfully had a right to

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Frederic S. Baum & Joan Baum, Law of Self-Defense 1 (1970).
Levin, supra note 6, at 528.
Id. at 530.
Suk, supra note 5, at 239.
Levin, supra note 6, at 531.
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25

be. Over time, this became known as the “True Man” doctrine and held
that an individual is not required to retreat, even if he can do so safely,
when he has a reasonable belief that he is in imminent danger of death or
26
great bodily harm and is in a place where he has a right to be. The
majority of jurisdictions eliminated the traditional duty to retreat, and in
doing so created “the paradigmatic case for understanding how the ‘true
27
man’ ought to be expected to behave.”
The policy surrounding the rule initially aimed to protect a person
28
from having to flee a dangerous situation in a cowardly way. In 1877,
the Indiana Supreme Court noted that “the tendency of the American
mind seems to be very strongly against the enforcement of any rule
29
which requires a person to flee when assailed, to avoid chastisement.”
In other words, American culture supported the rule that retreat should
not be required if it would lead to embarrassment. The ideology behind
the true man “enabled judges to leverage this appealing idea of a man
defending his home and family into a more general authorization of selfdefense in public places, even where the home and family were nowhere
30
to be seen.” Throughout the twentieth century, courts upheld an
individual’s use of deadly force against an assailant without retreat
wherever the individual had a right to be, and this right was protected both
in public places and locations where the individual had a proprietary
31
interest. In modern American law, a majority of jurisdictions do not
32
require an individual to retreat before using self-defense.
B. Current State of the True Man Doctrine
The True Man doctrine experienced a revival in the twenty-first
century, largely thanks to the lobbying efforts of the National Rifle
33
Association. Beginning with Florida in 2005, state legislatures adopted
renewed forms of Stand Your Ground laws that allow citizens to use

25. See Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 561–62 (1895) (quoting Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80,
83 (1877)).
26. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.7 (1986);
40 Corpus Juris Secundum: Homicide § 206, at 29 (2012).
27. Levin, supra note 6, at 531.
28. See, e.g., Suk, supra note 5, at 241–44.
29. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877).
30. Suk, supra note 5, at 245.
31. Id. at 246 (“[T]he right accompanied the individual wherever he went. The rule of no duty to
retreat was based on a right to be in any legitimate place. It was the intrusion on that right that
relieved the person of the duty to retreat.”).
32. LaFave & Scott, supra note 26, § 5.7(f).
33. Suk, supra note 5, at 260.
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34

deadly force against aggressors in public places. Specifically, the Florida
Stand Your Ground statute provides:
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is
attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet
force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes
it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself
or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible
35
felony.

Florida’s prototypical self-defense law codifies and broadens the
traditional True Man doctrine in three ways: “[I]t expands the
circumstances in which the use of deadly force is permitted in the home;
it abrogates the duty to retreat in public places; and it creates criminal
36
and civil immunity for people who act in self-defense.”
The 2012 killing of Trayvon Martin, an African-American teenager,
brought Stand Your Ground laws under national scrutiny and
highlighted the potential for racial profiling and bias to influence an
37
individual’s perception of imminent harm. Martin’s killer, George
Zimmerman, admitted to shooting the unarmed teen in self-defense, and
38
a Florida jury acquitted him in July 2013. The return of these statutes is
unsurprisingly controversial, as it inserts the ideology of the Wild West
into modern neighborhoods, and it permits a person to use deadly force
outside of the home, even in situations where retreat is both possible and
potentially more reasonable than facing a perceived aggressor.
For the minority of states that continue to impose a retreat
requirement, nearly all of them have adopted an exception for the
39
home. However, even in the jurisdictions that exclude attacks within the
home from the retreat requirement on the basis of the castle doctrine,
they disagree as to whether this exception applies when someone is
attacked by a cohabitant inside the home rather than an unlawful
40
intruder. In 1914, Judge Cardozo wrote:

34. Fla. Stat. § 776.013(3) (2008).
35. Id.
36. Suk, supra note 5, at 261.
37. Although this Note does not focus on the racial aspects of Stand Your Ground laws, or of selfdefense law generally, this is an important issue in the debate over the justified use of deadly force. See
generally Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse
210 (2012); Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon
Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U.
Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 271 (2012); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias
in a not yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 101 (2013).
38. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y.
Times, June 14, 2013, at A1.
39. LaFave & Scott, supra note 26, § 5.7(f).
40. Id.
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It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own
dwelling, is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground,
and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the
highways, a fugitive from his own home. . . . The rule is the same
whether the attack proceeds from some other occupant or from an
41
intruder.

Judge Cardozo’s opinion on the use of force against a cohabitant
reflected the relationship between a man and his home, and reiterated
42
the rights of the true man. It is unclear how Judge Cardozo’s reasoning
should extend to cases of domestic violence, but his logic certainly
supports eliminating a duty to retreat inside the home in such cases. Such
an interpretation would give an abused woman the crucial legal authority
to defend herself inside her home against a known attacker.
Courts have recognized the negative policy implications of imposing
43
a duty to retreat inside the home during attacks from co-occupants.
Jeanne Suk raises an interesting comparison on the inability to use force
against an abusive cohabitant and the implications for women attempting
to use a Stand Your Ground theory of self-defense:
If the American “true man” rule was based on the idea of a man being
in a place where he has a right to be, the home was of course the
quintessential place where a man had a right to be. If a person does not
have a right to be at home, there is perhaps no place where he has a
44
right to be.

If the law authorizes individuals to use deadly force without a duty
to retreat both in public and inside the home pursuant to the True Man
doctrine, women should be able to use similar self-defense claims under
BWS. Both of these doctrines involve situations in which an individual
faces a threat of violence from an aggressor. For battered women, their
experiences with their partners have taught them to expect an attack at
certain times, such as when their partner is drunk or when he gets home
45
from work. Requiring women to retreat in these circumstances is not
always feasible because many abused women have nowhere else to go, or
alternatively, fear a retaliatory attack if they are able to escape
46
temporarily.
Conversely, individuals facing an unknown attacker are not always
physically bound to the location of the attack. In public places, a person
41. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497–98 (N.Y. 1914).
42. Suk, supra note 5, at 249.
43. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (“[I]mposing a duty to retreat from the
residence has a potentially damaging effect on victims of domestic violence claiming self-defense.”);
see also State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570–71 (N.J. 1997); State v. White, 819 N.W. 2d 473, 477 (Neb.
Ct. App. 2012).
44. Suk, supra note 5, at 247.
45. See, e.g., Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:2.
46. See, e.g., Suk, supra note 5, at 253.
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standing his ground also has the opportunity to retreat to his home or
otherwise avoid a more violent confrontation. While the attack in this
case may appear more imminent, the necessity of force to protect oneself
is likely less than what is required of abused women to fight off their
abuser on a regular basis. Thus, the duty to retreat should similarly be
excluded in the domestic violence context. Unfortunately, courts and
juries often view the duty to retreat from an abusive partner differently
than the duty to retreat when the aggressor is an intruder or even a coowner of property.

II. The Helpless Woman: Battered Women’s Syndrome and
Related Evidentiary Burdens
The story of one New Jersey couple provides a helpful introduction
to the legal struggles faced by battered women. Throughout Gladys and
Ernest Kelly’s seven-year marriage, Ernest beat Gladys as often as once
47
a week. The attacks generally occurred after Ernest drank, and he
frequently “threatened to kill Ms. Kelly and to cut off parts of her body if
48
she tried to leave him.” One afternoon, a drunken Ernest knocked
49
Gladys down in public, choked her, punched her, and bit her leg. When
Gladys eventually got up to look for her daughter, Ernest ran toward her
50
with his hands raised and appeared right next to her within seconds.
Gladys did not know whether her husband had armed himself while she
searched for her daughter, so she grabbed a pair of scissors from her
51
pocketbook. Although she intended to merely scare him with the
52
scissors, she ultimately stabbed and killed him. The trial court convicted
Gladys Kelly of reckless manslaughter and rejected her claim of selfdefense because the jury determined that her perception of danger was
53
unreasonable. The Kelly case provides an example of how courts
evaluated abused women’s self-defense claims prior to the acceptance of
54
BWS.
Under traditional self-defense law, a defendant carries the burden of
showing that he used force out of necessity to avoid an imminent attack by

47. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369 (N.J. 1984).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 368.
54. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the decision of the trial court and
remanded the case due to the lower court’s error in excluding expert testimony on BWS, and for the
first time, the court held that such expert testimony is admissible to help establish claims of selfdefense in homicide cases. Id.
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an aggressor. In cases involving domestic violence, many women fail to
meet this burden due to the imminence element, which requires the actor
to reasonably believe that an attack is just about to occur. For women
who consistently face abuse by a partner, a reasonable belief that an
attack might occur in the near future is insufficient to establish
56
imminence. Particularly in cases in which the woman kills while her
abuser’s back is turned, “[s]uch killings, under traditional self-defense
concepts, are thought to be inspired by cowardice or revenge on the part
of one of two equal combatants. In legal parlance, this type of behavior
does not merit the privilege of self-defense because the danger does not
57
appear to be imminent.” Therefore, women who killed their abusers
outside of the moment immediately preceding an attack (when their
abusers were asleep, for example) had no defense under the criminal
58
law.
In 1979, clinical researcher Lenore Walker originated BWS as a
psychological doctrine, seeking to provide a stopgap between the
traditional elements of self-defense and a logical extension of the policy
59
to the context of domestic violence. However, women still face
significant obstacles due to the traditional imminence requirement
because their opportunity to fight back may not occur immediately
before a beating. A battered woman’s perception of danger is wholly
dependent on her experience of past abuse, which is generally considered
60
irrelevant under the traditional self-defense paradigm.
The Syndrome consists of two related psychological concepts. The
first is the idea of “learned helplessness,” in which an abused woman
develops an unwillingness or inability to seek help from others, even
61
when it is made available. Learned helplessness helps to counteract
common views that a woman failed to leave an abusive relationship and
62
therefore consented to the abuse. Psychologist Martin Seligman
originally coined the expression of “learned helplessness” to describe
63
laboratory dogs’ behavior after being subjected to electric shocks.
55. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:2.
56. See id.
57. Maryanne E. Kampmann, The Legal Victimization of Battered Women, 15 Women’s Rts. L.
Rep. 101, 112 (1993).
58. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:2.
59. Id. § 13:1 (“According to Walker, the syndrome . . . explains why battered women sometimes
kill their abusers under circumstances that do not mirror traditional cases of self-defense. Specifically,
syndrome advocates seek to explain why battered women sometimes resort to deadly force when,
seemingly, they are not confronted by an imminent harm.”).
60. Kampmann, supra note 57, at 112.
61. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:5.
62. Id.
63. See generally Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J.
Abnormal Psychol. 256 (1968).
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Throughout his experiments, Seligman discovered that “[a]fter initial
attempts to escape proved futile, the dogs began to submit to the shocks
without resistance. When the procedure was changed to present the dogs
64
with an opportunity to escape, the ‘helpless’ dogs failed to respond.”
Walker analogized these results to battered women and found that
over time, women similarly became “learned helpless” and lost
65
motivation to respond to violent stimuli. According to one court, some
women “become so demoralized and degraded by the fact that they
cannot predict or control the violence that they sink into a state of
psychological paralysis and become unable to take any action at all to
66
improve or alter the situation.” Learned helplessness works in
conjunction with the second aspect of BWS to explain the particular
67
circumstances and perceptions of battered women.
The second psychological aspect of BWS is the Walker Cycle
Theory, in which a woman’s sense of helplessness is reinforced by a cycle
of violence consisting of (1) a tension-building phase; (2) an explosion of
68
violence; and (3) a phase of loving contrition. “[A]ccording to the cycle
theory, the woman experiences the growing tension of phase one,
develops a fear of death or serious bodily harm during phase two, and,
perceiving that she will be unable to defend herself when the next attack
69
comes, finally ‘defends’ herself at her only opportunity.” The theory
demonstrates the relationship between two critical issues in a selfdefense claim: the defendant’s reasonable belief that force is necessary,
70
and the reasonableness of the amount of force used. A woman’s
knowledge of her abuser’s violent history influences her perception of
danger, and her experience throughout the cycles leaves her in a constant
71
fear of an imminent attack.
Because many BWS cases involve women who cannot physically
defend themselves against larger and stronger aggressors, the amount of
force used can seem disproportionate. Traditional self-defense law
assumes two individuals equal in “size, strength, and physical training,”
but women are generally smaller, weaker, and lack similar physical
72
training. The woman may believe that her abuser is physically capable

64. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:5 n.5 (citing Seligman et al., supra note 63).
65. Id. § 13:5.
66. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984).
67. Feminist scholars have debated the validity of the learned helplessness theory. See generally
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of
Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 213 (1992).
68. See Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 95–104 (1984).
69. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:4.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Schneider, supra note 1, at 632.
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of injuring or killing her without a weapon. “If a woman perceives
herself to be trapped in a cycle of potentially deadly violence, she may
reasonably feel compelled to resort to deadly force in preempting the
74
aggression of the unarmed but more powerful man.” Accordingly, in
many cases it is perfectly reasonable for a woman to arm herself with a
weapon to ward off a bigger and stronger aggressor.
Additionally, a woman cannot physically retreat any further than
her own home. In State v. Thomas, the Ohio Supreme Court described
that “a person in her own home has already retreated ‘to the wall,’ as
75
there is no place to which she can further flee in safety.” This
observation parallels the concerns about the duty to retreat in the castle
doctrine and early self-defense law, yet it is treated differently in the
domestic violence context.
Generally, the law considers BWS as a psychological condition apart
from other legal defenses. Rather than focusing on a woman’s testimony
about her personal perception of the likelihood of an attack from her
abuser, BWS relies on expert testimony to prove the woman’s psychiatric
condition and to show her subjective and honest belief that force was
76
necessary to protect herself from an attack. The requirement of expert
psychological testimony objectively supports the woman’s argument that
she acted reasonably under the circumstances and in light of her
experience with her abusive partner, but does not always permit the
individual woman’s story to be heard.
BWS critics take issue with the objective element of the self-defense
standard, “arguing that even if a battered woman who killed under nonconfrontational circumstances honestly believed that defensive force was
77
necessary, her belief could not have been reasonable.” The importance
of psychological evaluations overshadows the testimony of the woman
herself. Indeed, in some cases, expert testimony entirely replaces the
woman’s testimony: the expert can testify that the defendant suffers from
BWS and the defendant can avoid waiving her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Although there are cases in which
the expert would provide better testimony than the defendant, the jury
should be allowed to consider the abused woman’s personal history of
78
abuse in assessing her self-defense claim. There are certainly situations
73. Id.
74. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:4.
75. State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997).
76. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:11.
77. Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women’s
Self-Defense, 23 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 155, 164 (2004) (citing Stephen J. Morse, The “New
Syndrome Excuse Syndrome”, 14 Crim. Just. Ethics, no. 1, at 12 (1995)).
78. David Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical
Dissent, 72 Va. L. Rev. 619, 622 (1986) (arguing that juries should be allowed to consider the abused
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where the woman, and not the expert, is in the best position to describe
her experiences and environment and how they relate to the
reasonableness of her use of force. Defendants invoking Stand Your
Ground defenses are not required to jump the expert testimony hurdle
that can complicate matters for BWS defendants.
The most extreme view of BWS appears in Louisiana, where the law
essentially treats the Syndrome as an insanity defense that might excuse
79
the use of deadly force but not justify it. Critics of Louisiana’s approach
argue that BWS is only meant to show the reasonableness of a defendant’s
80
actions. Indeed, there is no language in Walker’s original description of
the doctrine requiring a woman to suffer from “any claimed psychological
81
incapacity.” As David Faigman describes, much of the confusion over the
purpose of the doctrine arises from the name of the doctrine itself:
Foremost, the choice of the label “syndrome” suggests a
medical/biological genesis for the condition, rather than a social or
behavioral basis. Undoubtedly, advocates believe that likening the
phenomenon to a medical condition or malady enhances its
credibility. . . . What began as an attempt to educate the law on the
realities and necessities of domestic violence has evolved into an
excuse-based defense founded on the helplessness of the woman
defendant. Moreover, the medical linkage makes the action
“understandable” rather than “reasonable,” and thus fails to explain
why a battered woman kills with justification; instead, the syndrome
defense merely makes triers of fact sympathetic to the woman’s plight.
This might explain why syndrome testimony has been mainly effective
in reducing the severity of the offenses for which these defendants are
82
convicted, instead of winning outright acquittals.

Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish the constructed syndrome from
research on domestic violence generally.
Psychologists developed BWS as a proxy to get evidence in front of a
jury when it would otherwise be excluded for failing to meet the traditional
83
self-defense requirements. Research on domestic violence explores the
factors crucial to understanding the realities of battered women’s lives,
including anxiety, depression, fear of retaliation, death rate statistics,
84
lack of support networks, and economic dependence. All of these
factors are relevant to battered women’s self-defense claims and should

woman’s personal history of abuse in assessing her claim of self-defense).
79. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:14; see also State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660 (La. 1985)
(refusing to admit expert testimony to show a defendant suffered from BWS absent a plea of either
“not guilty” or “not guilty by the reason of insanity”).
80. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:14.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. §§ 13:14–15.
84. Id. § 13:8.
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be admissible as evidence that supports the narrative. The generalized
aspects of BWS cannot adequately address these issues because it focuses
on psychological standards that do not necessarily apply to all battered
women. Further, a woman need not suffer from a psychological
syndrome or defect to experience these socio-psychological effects.
In practice, BWS doctrine reinforces the woman as subordinate and
suggests that an abused woman eventually loses control over her own
free will and is driven to kill by an inescapable state of helplessness.
However, “learned helplessness, as a psychological construct, is
fundamentally at odds with a situation in which a woman has exercised
85
the degree of control reflected in the act of self-defense.” Self-defense is
an inherently affirmative act, and the psychology behind BWS fails to
take into account the will required by a person to kill another in defense
of oneself. If battered women always faced helplessness to the point of
paralysis, realistically they would not be able to use any degree of force
against their abusers. Moreover, reliance on formal psychological
evidence “turns a blind eye to the woman’s history of abuse, to the social
and economic pressures preventing her from leaving, and to her
86
Indeed, expert testimony and psychological
engrossing fear.”
evaluations provides little relevant information when a woman’s reason
for staying in the relationship is not because of a psychological defect,
87
but rather concerns about economic dependence or her children.
The common law of self-defense provides a basis for applying the
True Man rationale in cases of battered women, allowing a woman to
stand her ground in her own house regardless of whether the aggressor is
88
an intruder or an abusive significant other. Instead, courts have
distinguished between traditional castle doctrine cases where the
aggressor is an intruder, and the castle doctrine as applied to battered
89
women with a significant other as the aggressor. Even benign
distinctions between the two scenarios show signs of paternalism. For
example, in Weiand v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
there is no duty to retreat inside the home before a defendant may use
deadly force against a cohabitant in self-defense if it is necessary to
90
prevent death or serious injury. In Weiand, the court cited two policy
rationales for its decision: (1) “imposing a duty to retreat from the home
may adversely impact victims of domestic violence,” and (2) “[a] jury

85. Id.
86. See Faigman, supra note 78, at 643.
87. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:8; see also Schneider, supra note 1, at 627 (discussing
practical reasons why battered women fail to leave their abusive relationships).
88. Suk, supra note 5, at 255.
89. Id. (citing State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564 (N.J. 1997)).
90. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999).
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instruction on the duty to retreat may reinforce common myths about
91
domestic violence.”
Despite these important policy goals, critics of the decision argue
that the court relied not on the empowering common law tradition but
instead replaced this narrative with a woman unable to retreat because of
92
her subordinate power position. In doing so, the court “replaced the
true man acting within his rights with the subordinated woman unable to
retreat” and “brought to bear a feminist critique to conceptualize
93
violence in the home as subordination rather than intrusion.” Although
the Florida Supreme Court created a rule in hopes of benefitting battered
women, the rationale continues to place women in positions of inferiority.
Ultimately, the stereotypes embedded in BWS doctrine
disadvantage women with valid self-defense claims. Courts remain
uncertain about how to utilize evidence of abuse, and the focus on
psychological infirmary distracts from the inquiry into the reasonableness
of a defendant’s conduct in light of her circumstances. This inquiry should
not only allow a woman to describe her experience of helplessness, but
should also rise to empowerment and her need to stand her ground and
protect herself, her family, and her home from an attacker.
Some scholars argue that the rise of Stand Your Ground laws is
actually positive for women because the statutes integrate BWS into the
94
True Man doctrine. In particular, the new Florida law permits
individuals “to treat a cohabitant as an intruder if a [domestic violence]
protection order commands him to stay away from the home” and
therefore “embeds [domestic violence] within the home invasion
95
paradigm.” Although this addition to the castle doctrine is an
improvement, the statute still requires women to obtain a protective
96
order before they are able to protect themselves in their own home. The
prerequisite of a protective order is not always feasible or obtainable, but
it is necessary under the Florida law for women to treat their abusers the
same as intruders.
Unfortunately, law enforcement often provides insufficient
97
protection to abused women. Sometimes police do not respond to the
domestic dispute call at all, or the call does not result in an arrest of the

91. Id. at 1052–54.
92. Suk, supra note 5, at 257–58.
93. Id. at 258.
94. Id. at 264 (describing a new narrative in self-defense doctrine of the “true woman”).
95. Id. at 240.
96. Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (2012). The Florida House has proposed a bill to repeal section 776.013,
but at the time of publication, the legislature had not yet clarified what rules would instead apply to
the use of deadly force in the home against a co-resident without a protective injunction. See
H.B. 4003, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014).
97. Schneider, supra note 1, at 626.
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98

abuser. Reliance on law enforcement to receive legal protections could
prove to be a deterring obstacle for some women who face the constant
threat of angering their abusers and suffering retaliatory attacks. The
failure of police to adequately protect battered women from their
abusers demonstrates both the impracticality of Florida’s requirement of
a protective order and the need for abused women to sometimes take the
99
law into her own hands.
Moreover, Professor Suk concedes that the Florida law limits the
right to stand one’s ground in domestic violence situations to only when a
100
victim is actually being physically abused. In other words, women must
be in the throes of a violent attack before they are permitted to use force
101
under the statute. Thus, even under the new and broadly construed
self-defense law in Florida, a battered woman is not permitted to use
force to protect herself in her own home against an aggressor when the
aggressor does not fit into the typical intruder paradigm.
Until battered women can effectively prove the reasonableness of
their use of deadly force without a near-showing of insanity or the need
to jump through procedural hoops, self-defense law will continue to be
embedded with gender stereotypes. Reforming self-defense doctrines to
be more conducive to gender-neutral claims would allow defendants to
prove their claims on the basis of reasonableness and remove the need
for extreme ideologies about masculinity or femininity to make a
successful self-defense claim. The challenge for reformers, however, will
be changing biases and preconceived views of the jurors determining the
outcome of these cases. The psychology behind juror decision-making is
often so subconscious as to potentially prevent effective legal reform of
these two gendered self-defense theories.

III. Juror Decisionmaking and Social Psychology
Social psychology plays an important role in evaluating how jurors
make decisions. Juries, comprised of a diverse collection of the
community, with varying degrees of education and exposure to legal
subject matter, must interpret the multitude of facts put in front of them
98. Id. (citing Police Found., Domestic Violence and the Police 10–18 (1977)) (“85 percent of
domestic violence cases, the police had been summoned at least once within the two-year period
before the homicide occurred.”).
99. Id. (citing Police Found., Domestic Violence and the Police 10–18 (1977)) (“[T]he law
enforcement system fails to protect women from abuse. The police often fail to respond to domestic
disturbance calls. When they do respond, arrest is unlikely; police policy and training manuals stress
mediation of domestic disputes rather than arrest. One study reports that in 85 percent of domestic
violence cases, the police had been summoned at least once within the two-year period before the
homicide occurred. The dead person was usually the woman.”).
100. Suk, supra note 5, at 268.
101. Id.

6. Keegan_14 (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2013]

12/2/2013 1:21 PM

THE TRUE MAN

275

and decide what information ultimately supports a finding of guilty or
not guilty. Psychologists Reid Hastie and Nancy Pennington suggest that
in order to make sense of the overwhelming amount of information
presented, a juror uses “story structures to organize and interpret
102
evidence.” Dr. Hastie describes this “story model” of decisionmaking
as being “constructed from information explicitly presented at trial and
knowledge possessed by the juror. Two kinds of knowledge are critical:
(a) expectations about what makes a complete story and (b) knowledge
103
about events similar in content to those that are the topic of dispute.”
This information tells the juror when relevant pieces of the story are
104
missing, and when inferences should be made. Story organization is
crucial for jurors because it can not only determine their choice in
105
verdict, but also affect their confidence in their vote.
A. The Use of Narratives in Jury Trials
The success of self-defense claims often hangs on whether the jury
believes a defendant’s account of what happened. As a result, defendants
tailor the facts of their case to track the legal definition of self-defense as
106
closely as possible. A defendant’s success in a self-defense claim “will
depend on both credibility and fit—that is, the rest of us must believe the
defendant’s recounting is true to both reality and the legal definition of
self-defense before we, too, designate it self-defense and withhold
107
punishment.” To appear more believable to a jury, the defendant’s
narrative “may entail some stretching of the definition to fit the facts, as
108
well as facts to definition.” Therefore, a jury’s interpretation of the
defendant’s story can make the difference between a guilty verdict and
an acquittal.
The challenge is that even when a defendant has a logically
constructed story, some jurors simply do not consider it believable or
109
reliable. Research on the story model shows that “jurors decide cases
by fitting the evidence presented by the parties into one or more ‘verdict
stories,’ and then selecting the story that appears most plausible and

102. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory
Structure on Judgment, 14 J. Experimental Psychol.: Learning, Memory & Cognition 521, 521 (1988).
103. Id. at 522.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 530.
106. Janine Young Kim, The Rhetoric of Self-Defense, 13 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 261, 264 (2008).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 102, at 530 (“Any advantage in confidence in a not guilty
verdict that might arise from having the complete defense story may have been offset by its level of
plausibility, even though knowing the complete story was sufficient to move verdict decisions
substantially in the not guilty direction.”).
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coherent to them.”
Moreover, jurors have “preconceptions and
attitudes that lead them to entertain particular stories about what may
111
have happened” and what verdict they should choose. Ultimately, the
defense must anticipate these expectations, because jurors,
spontaneously and without prompting, construct their own story
112
structure in order to mentally summarize the evidence.
During trial, the story structure aids jurors in recalling events and
113
constructing a mental picture of the alleged crime:
[T]he situational elaborations on which such judgments must be based
imply the particular proposition so strongly that subjects believe they
have seen the statement as evidence . . . . Moreover, subjects make
false recognition judgments almost as fast as they make judgments
about sentences that they have seen, and they make them
114
systematically.

These judgments, based on the information’s position in the story’s
structure, have resounding effects on how much weight a juror gives an
115
individual piece of evidence. However, the coherence of one story is
not the only factor to consider in predicting jurors’ decisions, as
perceptions of the importance of certain evidence depend on the strength
116
of one story compared with the alternative narrative.
From the opening statement onward, jurors begin constructing the
evidence into the story that makes the most sense to them. Each attorney
has a brief window of time to frame the most convincing story, because
all else being equal, the “probability of obtaining a verdict consistent
with a story increases when the story is ‘primed’ in the opening
117
statement.” Defense counsel must simultaneously hook the jury with a
believable and relatable story while not over-generalizing the individual
defendant’s personal narrative. This task is exceedingly difficult given the
additional responsibility of proving that the defendant’s actions were
objectively reasonable in light of the specific circumstances.

110. Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev.
1455, 1472 (2010).
111. Id. (citing Lynda Olsen-Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape Judgments: An
Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 402, 418 (1997)).
112. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 102, at 527.
113. Id. (“Furthermore, this chronologically ordered causal explanation also serves as a retrieval
system when subjects are confronted with a memory task.”).
114. Id.
115. Id. (“[S]ubjects’ ratings of the importance of evidence items to their decision can be predicted
from the items’ story membership and from the position of the item in the story’s causal structure.”).
116. Id. at 530.
117. Reid Hastie, The Role of “Stories” in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 227, 232
(1999) (noting the role of stories in criminal cases as a point of comparison).
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B. Jurors and the “Reasonable Person”
In determining whether defendants are guilty or not, juries are often
asked to evaluate what a “reasonable person” would have done in the
same circumstances. The reasonable person is an elusive concept because
it is meant to be an objective test, but necessarily must consider the
particular context of a defendant’s situation. On the one hand, if the jury
envisions the reasonable person as exactly the same as the defendant in
terms of background, experiences, and perceptions, then the reasonable
person would naturally act similarly to the defendant under the same
118
circumstances. Conversely, “a purely objective standard is unduly harsh
because it ignores the characteristics which inevitably and justifiably
shape the defender’s perspective, thus holding him (or her) to a standard
119
he simply cannot meet.” One of the greatest challenges in assessing
self-defense claims is “striking the balance between the defender’s
subjective perceptions and those of the hypothetical reasonable
120
person.”
The elusiveness of the reasonable person standard is controversial
because of its acceptance of cultural preferences as to who embodies the
reasonable person and how a reasonable person should behave in a given
121
situation. The reasonable person standard calls into question “hotly
contested normative disputes over racial anxiety, gender roles, physical
violence, and other divisive issues, by shifting attention away from
explicitly political valuations by the state and towards factual judgments
122
during jury deliberations or in the judge’s chambers.” By leaving the
decision of who constitutes a “reasonable” person up to a random jury
pool, the state avoids the blame for choosing between competing norms.
This transfer of decisionmaking power from the state to the jury box
comes at a high cost because it grants “fact-finders the freedom to
privately succumb to the kind of bias that would, if made public, offend
our liberal commitments not only to shared forms of justification, but
123
also to equality, the universal value of human life, and public reason.”
While this solution may temporarily dodge political confrontations,
localized fact-finding by juries opens the door to individual prejudices
124
and inconsistency.
In the criminal context, this decentralization of normative
judgments is even more concerning. Under a reasonable person analysis,

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 513 (1978).
Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1430, 1434 (1990).
Id.
Braman, supra note 110, at 1457.
Id.
Id. at 1459.
Id. at 1457.
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the issue of who should be punished for homicide (a normative
judgment) is transformed into a factual question for the jury to decide.
Accordingly, it is important to consider the relationship between factual
issues and a juror’s beliefs, which is also referred to as “cultural
125
cognition.” Psychologists define cultural cognition as “a collection of
social and psychological mechanisms that cause individuals to conform
126
their factual beliefs to their core values and cultural commitments.”
People often align factual ideas with their core values in a “strikingly
127
Studies explain that this occurs “both because
consistent” way.
individuals process information in ways that minimize the dissonance
between their factual beliefs and their values, and because they are more
likely to seek out and be exposed to information from those with whom
128
they feel they share important values.” Despite an individual’s attempts
to be objective in evaluating evidence, such thought processes are nearly
129
involuntary.
This understanding of cultural cognition is directly related to Dr.
Hastie’s story model and his description of how a juror’s expectations
factor in to how he or she evaluates evidence. Donald Braman explains:
[J]urors are less likely to even recall evidence that is inconsistent with
their preferred verdict story, removing culturally unacceptable
evidence from consideration. And of course, to the extent that jurors in
a culturally diverse society are likely to enter the jury room with
diverse and even antagonistic cultural prototypes, they will sometimes
disagree over verdicts because they won’t agree on what the evidence
130
means—or even what the evidence is.

Such studies emphasize how a juror’s personal views on normative
values affect her ability to recall and interpret evidence. When jurors
disagree on the meaning of the evidence, cultural cognition leads people
with different values to competing assessments of the defendant’s
131
culpability.

125. Id. at 1458.
126. Id.
127. Braman, supra note 110, at 1458.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1474–75 (“Culturally diverse individuals honestly believe they are putting their own
partisan commitments aside and basing their judgments on their perception of the facts of the
matter—but those perceptions vary along culturally predictable lines. People with different outlooks
may arrive at different assessments of culpability, then, but they do so through earnest attempts to be
objective.”).
130. Braman, supra note 110, at 1472–73.
131. Id. at 1473.
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IV. Prospects for Legal Reform in a Legal System That Codifies
Gender Stereotypes
Any hope for effective legal reform must take into account the
jury’s approach to processing and deciding self-defense claims. Through
the story structure, juries compare moralities of the two actors
132
involved. Heroes and villains are created through the mere act of
133
juxtaposing an unaware self-defender with a malicious assailant.
However, this construct exposes the clear masculine bias that pervades
self-defense claims. From the Wild West to the home, “countering unjust
violence with just violence evokes romanticized images of the [man],
defending himself (and perhaps also his honor) against the perils of the
134
lawless frontier.” The view of the strong and righteous man is
fundamentally at odds with the picture painted by BWS narratives.
Unsurprisingly, fearful and helpless female defendants do not
conjure images of honor and righteousness in the minds of jurors.
Professor Janine Kim describes:
[T]he violent ideal of self-defense does not so readily suit the conduct
of women, who are generally expected to cry and fail in deadly
confrontation. Accordingly, this gendered narrative implies that
defensive violence under the paradigm is not so much heated and
impulsive (i.e., emotional, like women) as it is rational and even
135
judicious.

One scholar accuses self-defense law of maintaining a set of boys’
rules, or “rules that might make sense in the context of men fighting
other men, but which have no place in the context of male-on-female
136
aggression or, therefore, the case of female-on-male self-protection.”
Indeed, reformers face challenges in persuading courts to allow selfdefense jury instructions when the context of the homicide is non137
confrontational, as are many homicides in BWS cases.
Additionally, the gender bias in BWS increases the likelihood that
the jury will merely excuse the woman’s conduct, but find it unjustified
138
under the law. When a defense is treated as an excuse rather than a
justification, the jury views the defendant’s act as wrong and only
139
tolerable because of her mental or emotional state. Conversely,
justified conduct is encouraged under the law, and the jury approves of

132. Kim, supra note 106, at 266.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 266–67.
135. Id. at 267 (citation omitted).
136. Joshua Dressler, Feminist (Or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some Critical
Reflections, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 1475, 1480 (2010).
137. Id. at 1488.
138. Schneider, supra note 1, at 638.
139. Id. at 631.
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the defendant’s act because of the surrounding circumstances. The jury
first looks to see if the circumstances of the act justify self-defense, and if
not, the jury then assesses the defendant’s mental and emotional state to
141
see if this particular actor should be excused. Historically, excuse
defenses have had a detrimental effect on women because even acquittal
in homicide cases still results in involuntary commitment to psychiatric
142
institutions. The prevalent view that battered women acting in selfdefense is an insanity defense (excuse) rather than a traditional selfdefense claim (justification) is a significant disadvantage for female
143
defendants trying to persuade the jury.
The factual issues presented in True Man and BWS cases, as well as
the type of inferences needed to resolve the issues, are practically
144
indistinguishable. Braman conducted a study based on two fictional
defendants modeled after the real cases of Bernard Goetz and Judy
Norman. Goetz shot and wounded three young African-Americans on
the subway after one of them confronted Goetz and said “give me five
145
dollars.” Norman shot and killed her husband in his sleep after years of
146
Professor
abuse and failed attempts to obtain police protection.
Braman’s study found that a juror’s likelihood of convicting each
defendant related to their specific gender, racial, political, and ideological
147
affiliations. This study explicitly assessed the effect of cultural cognition
on evaluating stand your ground versus BWS cases, and the results
demonstrate that jurors’ views on culpability significantly diverge along
148
cultural lines.
140. Id. at 630–31.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 638.
143. See Dressler, supra note 136, at 1488 (“Ironically, the practical effect of BWS evidence is to
pathologize the battered woman. Indeed, a juror simulation study has reported that ‘the presence of
expert evidence providing a diagnosis of [BWS], compared to a no expert control, [causes] the jurors
to view the defendant as more distorted in her thinking, and less capable of making responsible
choices, and less culpable for her actions.’ . . . [U]se of BWS testimony potentially brings courts back,
full circle, to the early battered women cases, in which women sought to defend themselves on grounds
of temporary insanity or diminished capacity.”).
144. Braman, supra note 110, at 1462–63 (noting similar issues included the danger posed by the
aggressor, the defendant’s insight informed by his or her personal experiences, and the feasibility of
alternatives).
145. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986).
146. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989).
147. Braman, supra note 110, at 1465–66 (“Blacks were more likely to convict George than they
were to convict Julie, while whites were more likely to convict Julie than George. Similar patterns
emerged for women and men, Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, egalitarians and
hierarchs, and communitarians and individualists. In each case, the former were more likely than the
latter to see George as more deserving of punishment than Julie.”).
148. Id. at 1468 (“[I]ndividuals will . . . [interpret legal standards] through interlocking social and
cognitive mechanisms that cause them to rely on a culturally contingent situation sense; an implicit
knowledge of how the material and social world works.”).
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Both BWS and the True Man doctrine are theories of self-defense
that address similar issues of imminence and necessity, but each theory
tells a completely different story. The process of proving a true man selfdefense claim is also strikingly dissimilar to a BWS claim, as true men
can testify upfront without expert testimony, without state-mandated
psychological evaluations, and without pleading an insanity defense.
With this evidentiary burden placed on BWS defenses, the law adopted a
model for women’s defense strategies that was essentially based on
psychological defects. Even if the outcomes are the same under either
theory, the fact that the models are so different creates problems and
independent obstacles.
Furthermore, these distinct narratives rely on the most classic
gender stereotypes. As such, self-defense law has solidified these
stereotypes into the substantive law. The stereotypical origins of the true
man have resounding effects on modern self-defense law. By codifying
what a man should do when faced with an assailant, the law makes
normative judgments on who is and is not justified in standing their
ground. The title of the doctrine itself excludes a majority of the
population from using the defense effectively because women do not
historically fit into the framework.
One possible solution is increased individualization in the jury’s
evaluation of facts. Elizabeth Schneider, an expert in gender, law, and
domestic violence, argues that allowing the jury to fully consider the
defendant’s circumstances and perspective is essential for battered women
149
to have comparable treatment in presenting self-defense claims.
Individualization is necessary in order to equalize the burden battered
women face in asserting their claims and to acknowledge the different
circumstances in which homicides committed by men and women
150
occur. Schneider asserts that “[w]ithout individualization, the trier of
fact may be unable either to overcome his stereotypical attitude toward
the circumstances surrounding the woman’s act or to understand the
151
inapplicability of traditional legal rules.” Increasing the individualized
analysis for self-defense claims would certainly improve a woman’s
ability to express her own perceptions and experience of abuse.
Further, individualization could work effectively in conjunction with
the objective reasonable person analysis under a standard of the
“reasonable person in a long-term violent relationship,” which would
necessarily take into account the defendant’s experiences with violence
and whether her actions were reasonable in light of those experiences.

149. Schneider, supra note 1, at 640.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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Striking a balance between the reasonable person analysis and
individualization would permit defendants to adequately present their
claims without having to completely restructure how juries assess
criminal defenses.
In the end, the jury is the decisionmaker and jurors must be invited
to exercise their good judgment. Jurors cannot do this unless they
understand or have an opportunity to understand why a defendant’s
conduct is justified. Because juries apply common sense and their own
experiences, which might include gender stereotypes, to legal decisionmaking, the law may be stuck with the current doctrines because of the
strongly held and easily understood narratives. At a minimum, legal
reforms should aim to remove these two defenses from their current
extremes. Within these narratives, there are extremes of both theories
that are not reasonable, and a middle ground in both that are completely
reasonable. Juries need individualization of defendants’ claims to
differentiate between the two. The reality is that reasonable people do
what they have to do under the circumstances, and this is where the
middle ground between battered women and true men lies. Individuals
should have the freedom to effectively use either doctrine based on a
showing of reasonableness, and not a showing of either John Wayne
courage or borderline insanity. The solution is to allow a system in which
the jury is permitted to truly understand the woman’s narrative within
the domestic violence context so that judge her behavior the same way it
would judge a man standing his ground.

Conclusion
The recent expansion of the True Man doctrine in many states
revived discussions of the self-defense law generally. Comparing the new
Stand Your Ground laws with BWS, it becomes apparent that the law
solidifies gender stereotypes by assessing when an individual is justified
in using deadly force against an aggressor. True men are empowered to
use deadly force even in public without a duty to retreat, while battered
women must provide expert testimony on her psychological condition to
prove the reasonableness of her use of deadly force in light of her
extreme helplessness. At their extremes, both of these doctrines are
detrimental to the criminal law, and potentially encourage dangerous
152
policy and undesirable public conduct. Legal reforms are needed to
moderate these extremes and to create a more gender-neutral process to
proving self-defense claims no matter the theory. While the psychology

152. The recent, tragic killing of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed, African-American teenager, reflects this
concern, as well as the potential for racial stereotypes to affect an individual’s perception of imminent danger
in public places. See generally Dan Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1.
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of juror decision-making and the roots of the classic narratives likely
limit prospects for reform, change is necessary to modernize and equalize
self-defense law. Ideally, a new legal framework of individualization for
proving self-defense claims can find the middle ground between the
empowerment doctrine of the true man and the helplessness ideology
behind Battered Women’s Syndrome, and will allow the jury to do its job
by listening to each defendant’s narrative regardless of whether it falls
under the traditional paradigm.

